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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

On June 30, 2016, the Estate of Frances Elaine Warren ("Estate") entered into a binding
written Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Tricore PSA") to sell 65 acres of undeveloped waterfront
Priest Lake property for $2,400,000. Ex. 213, COE 1 p. 329-345; R. p. 1997. The Tricore PSA
included a legal description of the Parcels to be sold. COE p. 342-343. Tricore used its eff01is
to determine the property was developable. R. p. 2005-2016. The Tricore PSA provided for
$20,000 in earnest money, a feasibility period until July 31, 2016, during which Tricore could
terminate the agreement, and a closing date of September 9, 2016. Ex. 213, COE p. 344. From
signing until closing was only about two months. Trial confirmed Tricore performed all its
contractual obligations. It paid $20,000 earnest money, the July 31, 2016 deadline passed without
Tricore terminating and the earnest money became non-refundable. R. p. 1998. All that was left
was for closing to occur. Trial confirmed the Estate, John Stockton, PLBM, LLC (Mr. Stockton
and PLBM, LLC jointly "Stockton"), Todd Brinkmeyer ("Brinkmeyer"), and Stockton's lawyers
all knew Tricore would close the Tricore PSA. Tr. pp.620-5, 81, 83-4
In August, 2016, the Priest Lake community "was buzzing with rumors that a developer
was going to purchase the Estate's property." R. p. 2000. Tricore disclosed to Brinkmeyer the

prope1iy was under contract and the development plans. Brinkmeyer commented "Stockton
would be devastated about the proposed development." On August 20, 2016, Stockton attended

a neighborhood meeting on Priest Lake opposing Tricore's development. R. p. 2000. Prior to
the meeting, Stockton did not believe the prope1iy could be developed. After, Stockton decided
to prevent Tricore from developing the property. On August 26, 2016, Stockton stated he was

1
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"having a meeting with influential people at the lake" and "[w]e may need to rally the troops."
R. p. 2001. August 29 to September 2, 2016, Brinkmeyer/Stockton solicited the Estate to breach
the Tricore PSA and to sell to Stockton/Brinkmeyer. R. p. 2002-2003.
On Friday September 2, Brinkmeyer, the Estate, the Estate's lawyer and Stockton's
counsel met, drafted and executed the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and an Indemnification
Agreement for the same property contracted to Tricore. R. p. 2003. The Stockton/Brinkmeyer
PSA used a legal description almost identical to that of the Tricore PSA and set closing for
September 6th. Ex. 2, COE p. 92-105. This was 3 days prior to the Tricore PSA closing and a
day after the Labor Day holiday. The Estate agreed to "repudiate their obligations under the

Warren-Tricore PSA ... " Ex. 8, COE p. 106; R. p. 2003. The Estate did not claim Tricore had
repudiated, that there was no "meeting of the minds" or that the Tricore PSA was unenforceable.
COE P. 106-8, Ex. 8, COE p. 106-109. On September 6, 2016, the Estate closed on the
Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA without notice to Tricore or the listing agent. R. p. 2004.
After closing, the Estate informed Tricore's counsel (Chuck Lempesis) the Estate had
decided to "proceed in a different direction." Ex. 51, COE p. 220. It did not disclose the property
had been sold and transferred. R. p. 2004. On September 7, 2016, Tricore reiterated its intention
to close the Tricore PSA as is. Ex. 54, COE p. 222. The Estate again did not mention it had been
sold the day before. On September 7, 2016, Tricore paid an additional $10,000 earnest money
to extend the closing to October 7, 2016. Id. R. p. 2004-2005. Tricore continued to move forward
with its plans to purchase the property, including obtaining a final wetland_ delineation report
from an expert for its development plan to purchase credits from a wetlands bank. R. p. 2005.
Only in late September, 2016, did Tricore finally learn the Estate had sold the property. Id.
Tricore filed this action to enforce its contract. The Estate and Stockton were jointly represented
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by the lawyers involved in negotiating and drafting the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and
Indemnification Agreement. At trial, the Estate designated attorney John Fillley it's Rule 30
(b)(6) representative, rather than either of the co-personal representatives, Chris and Dan W a11·en.
Tr. p.6. Trial established Stockton/Brinkmeyer both tumed down the oppottunity to purchase
the prope1ty from the Warren Estate in 2014-2015. T.Tr. pp.509-515. Stockton declined several
opp01tunities to buy because he did not believe it could be developed. Tr. p. 515-16; 523, 11. 1723. Stockton/Brinkmeyer conspired to interfere with Tricore's contract for the improper purpose
of usurping Tricore's development work and to harm Tricore by depriving Tricore of the
opportunity to develop the property.

Only after they learned Tri core's expe1iise made the

prope1ty developable did Stockton/Brinkmeyer wrongfully interfere with the Tricore PSA. In
pursuing this improper purpose, they engaged improper means to prevent the sale to Tricore,
including deceit, misrepresentations, actively requiring the Estate to breach and "repudiate" the
Tricore PSA and violating industry and trade standards. The Estate did not present any credible
evidence disputing its intentional breach of the Tricore PSA.

Only after the breach did

Stockton/Brinkmeyer attempt to provide justifications for their actions. Following a six day
bench trial and extensive closing briefing2 the Trial Court weighed the evidence, conflicting and
otherwise, and entered findings of fact which suppo1ied its conclusions.

B.

The Estate/Stockton/Brinkmeyer's assertions of "fact" are contrary to the
Court's findings of fact and the evidence at trial.

In their "Statement of Facts," Appellants fail to address or discuss the Trial Cami's
Findings of Fact and ignore the substantial evidence which contradicts their arguments. Instead,
they attempt to re-litigate the case by offering the same conclusory asseliions offered at trial.

The Comt and the Patties agreed to have closings submitted in writing. This was done after the trial had been
transcribed. Both the patties and the Comt had the benefit of the transcript.

2
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1.

No Admissible Evidence Exists of a "Right of First Refusal."

The Appellants argue the breach and interference was justified because Stockton
purported to have a Right of First Refusal (ROFR) that arose more than thirty (30) years before.
Bill Wanen died in 1993 and Elaine Wanen died in 2003. Tr. p. 96, 1.5; Tr. p. 66-67. 3 Stockton
did not present a creditor claim against the Estate. Nothing was ever recorded or in writing
confirming any RO FR. R. p. 199 5. A motion in limine excluding the testimony of hearsay from
Bill Warren was granted, and since it violated the deadman's statute and was ban-ed by the statute
of frauds. However, the Court still allowed testimony about the alleged ROFR as to intent as a
defense to Tricore's claims. Appellants asserted Bill Wanen had a "handshake" agreement that
constituted an undefined and unlimited ROFR to any of Warren's property. Tr. pp. 24-25. No
offer of proof was made as to how long such right would last, what property was affected by said
right or how or when the ROFR was to be exercised. Appellants claim the ROFR was as against

"any Priest Lake property offered/or sale by the Warren family". Tr. p. 25, 11.6-7. Stockton
could not describe the terms of his agreement in any detail.

Conveniently, no objective,

disinterested party is living to dispute the self-serving recollections of this purely oral
arrangement.

2.

Both Stockton and Brinkmeyer were offered and refused to purchase
the property at issue.

In 2014, prior to listing the property, the Estate offered to sell Stockton the property it later
sold to Tricore. Ex. 11, COE p. 113. The Estate offered Parcels A, B, and C.

Chris and Dan are willing to sell more of tlte parcels labeletl as
Parcel A anti Parcel C if a buyer wants to take on the responsibility
ofplatting a waterfront parcel for each of them and separating off
Chris ' house and water system.

3

This resulted in the appointment of Dan Wmrnn and his brother, Chris Warren, as Personal Representatives.
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Ex. 11, COE p. 113 (emphasis added). This is the same property Tricore purchased. In 2015,
the Estate again offered to sell the property to Stockton and Brinkmeyer. R. p. 1995-1996; Ex.
13, COE p. 118; and Ex. 14, COE p. 119. It was only after both refused that the Estate listed the
property with Realm Realty. R. p. 1995-1996. Stockton testified why he did not purchase the
property when it was offered pursuant to the purported ROFR.

Q.

A.

And the reason for that, we talked about this in your
deposition, was you didn't think anything could be done
witlt it; so wlty would you pay money for somet/ting tit at
couldn't be - something couldn't be done witlt, right?
Correct. I thought that the wetlands were being preserved
as wetlands forever.

Tr. p. 523, 11. 17-23 (emphasis added).

3.

The Warren Property Was Openly Marketed.

After Stockton/Brinkmeyer refused to purchase, the property was actively marketed
including for sale signs being posted. R. p. 1995; Ex. 68, COE p. 238.

4.

The Tricore PSA

The final terms of the Tricore PSA were set forth in Addendum No. 2 signed by the Estate
on June 30, 2016. Ex. 213, COE p. 329-345. Addendum No. 2 was drafted by the Estate. Ex.
23, COE 128-132. The Estate included the legal descriptions for the three Parcels (A, B, and C)
it was selling and also language describing the two lots Tricore agreed to develop for it after the
sale. Ex. 213, COE p. 342-343. The Tricore PSA described by legal description the property to
be transferred. Id. at ,r3 - "The Real Estate subject matter of tltis agreement is modified and

shall be increased and sltall include Parcel A, to be tlte following:"( emphasis added). Tricore
performed all of its obligations.

5.

The Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and Indemnification Agreement.

On September 2, 2016, Brinkmeyer and Stockton contracted to purchase the property from
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the Estate that was to be closed on by Tricore on September 9, 2016. They also entered into an
Indemnification Agreement which confirmed Brinkmeyer/Stockton caused the Estate to breach
the Tricore PSA. Ex. 8, COE p. 106 "Sellers have agreed to repudiate their obligations under
the Warren-Tricore PSA upon the execution of this Indemnification Agreement, which
repudiation shall be in writing and delivered to the third party named in the Warren-Tricore PSA
within two (2) calendar days."

Id.

Tricore was not provided any notice the Estate was

repudiating and breaching the Tricore PSA. Ex. 6, COE p. 793; Ex. 4, COE p. 794. The
Indemnification Agreement recognized the wrongfulness of the Brinkmeyer/Stockton sale. Ex.
8, COE p. 106.
Brinkmeyer/Stockton closed at 3:26 pm on September 6, 2016. Ex. 7, COE p.100. At 4:41
pm, after the property was transfened, for the first time the Estate informed Tricore it did not
intend to close the Tricore PSA and requested a "Termination ofReal Estate Purchase and Sale
Agreement." Ex. 51, COE p. 220. Yet, the Estate did not tell Tricore it had transfened the

property, disguising its termination request as deciding to "go in a different direction." R. 2004.
Within an hour, Tricore reaffirmed the Tricore PSA and that the additional $10,000 payment
would be made to extend the closing. Ex. 53, COE p. 221. On September 7, Tricore provided
the $10,000 and notice it was exercising its right to extend the closing. R. p. 2004-2005; Ex. 54,
COEp. 222.
Notably, evidence was presented established the Estate understood Tricore had not
repudiated the Tricore PSA. Under the terms of the Tricore PSA, if Tricore had repudiated, the
earnest money it paid would have been non-refundable. However, the Estate attempted to return
the Earnest money. Ex. 9, COE p. 110. Similarly, the Estate's conduct with regard Realm Reality
("Realm") is not consistent with Tricore repudiating. The Estate and Realm listing agreement
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listed Stockton and Brinkmeyer as "exclusions" for purposes of commissions. Ex. 201, COE p.
53. However, after selling the property to Stockton/Brinkmeyer, the Estate voluntarily paid a
commission to Realm. Tr. p. 442, 11. 4-6.

6.

The Estate, Stockton and Brinkmeyer Engaged in Deception to
Prevent Tricore From Closing on the Tricore PSA.

Trial confirmed the Brinkmeyer/Stockton sale was orchestrated to prevent Tricore from
knowing about the transaction and or preventing it. The sale was concealed from the Estate's
real estate broker, the Estate assured Tricore it would meet to discuss the Tricore PSA, and
actively worked to keep the sale secret until after recording. Stockton/Brinkmeyer' s attorney
directed the Estate to "send to Chuck [Lempesis] after we close this afternoon." See R. p. 2004
(emphasis added); Ex. 5, COE p. 797; and Ex. 6, COE p.793. Contrary to established standards,
Stockton/Brinkmeyer engaged in the improper purpose of directing the Estate to "repudiate" the
agreement. Ex. 8, COE p. 106. The purpose was to deprive Tricore of its business opportunity,
and the money it had expended to determine the developability of the property.
The day after closing, Mr. Finney met with the Estate's listing broker to inform him Tricore
would not be buying the property. Finney began by apologizing to the broker and offering to
compensate him for the commission fee on a sale expressly excluded from the listing agreement.
Tr. 412, 11. 12-24. When asked if Tricore would have any opportunity to purchase the Estate
property, Finney replied "it would take a lot of time and a lot of years, and would have to be

ordered by a judge." Tr. p.414, - IL 2-7.
IL

RESTATEMENT OF AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the Trial Court properly find the Tricore PSA, which contained the legal
description for the property being sold, did not violate the Statute of Frauds?

B.

Based upon the Findings of Fact entered, did the Trial Comt properly exercise its
discretion in entering Judgment in favor ofTricore?

C.

Did the Trial Court properly exercise its discretion in finding
Stockton/Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the Tricore PSA?

D.

Did the Trial Court properly exercise its discretion in finding
Stockton/Brinkmeyer engaged in a Civil Conspiracy?

E.

After find Tricore prevailed, was it proper for the Trial Court to award the
attorney fees and costs Tricore was forced to incur?

F.

Did the Trial Court properly exercise its discretion in setting the amount of the
supersedeas bond?

G.

Tricore seeks and requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant
to Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-107 and the terms of the Tricore PSA.

H.

Did the Trial Court e11· by failing to award any damages to Tricore for
Stockton/Brinkmeyer's Tortious Interference with a contract?

I.

Did the Trial Comi err by failing to award any damages to Tricore for
Stockton/Brinkmeyer' s violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A trial court's findings offact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier offact." Beckstead v. Price,

146 Idaho 57, 61 (2008)(intemal cites omitted). "Review of a District Court's findings offact is
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact and whether the findings
of fact support the conclusions of law." Roell v. Boise City~ 134 Idaho 214, 216 (2000). "A
District Court's findings offact in a court-tried case are construed liberally on appeal infavor of
the judgment entered. It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Electric Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v.

Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 820 (2001). "Indeed

'if the findings

offact are based on substantial

evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal." Credit Suisse

A.G. v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189, 195 (2013). Findings of fact will not be set aside
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unless clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg, L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643 (2006). The Supreme
Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Id. Appellants do not
identify any findings of fact not supported by the evidence. Nor do they even attempt to do so.
Instead, they ask the Court to reweigh the evidence. The findings on Tricore' s claims are supported
by substantial evidence and support the legal conclusions.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

IV.

Tricore was properly awarded the attorney fees it incun-ed to prevail. Appellants are not
entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. Tricore requests and should be awarded appellate
attorney fees and costs. Tricore's argument in support of and response to the attorney award issues
is set forth in Sections V. H. and VI. below.
V.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court correctly found Stockton's claim of a right of first refusal was
not admissible except for limited purposes.

Appellants arguments all ignore that whether a ROFR existed or not, the Estate offered the
property to Stockton and Brinlaneyer prior to listing the property for sale. They refused to
purchase it. The property was then listed and advertised. Neither Stockton nor Brinkmeyer made
any attempt to buy it. They were provided ample oppo1tunity to purchase the property. The essence
of the Estate's argument is Stockton's oral ROFR entitled it to breach the Tricore PSA with
impunity, so long as the Estate, whose litigation defense is provided by Stockton under the
Indemnification Agreement, and Stockton agree the ROFR was valid. Appellants' essentially
adopt a strategy loosely paraphrased in Benjamin Franklin's infamous quote at signing of the
Declaration oflndependence - "We must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang
separately." However, it does not serve as a legal defense to Tricore's claims. While the Court

granted the motion in limine barring testimony of Stockton's claim of a ROFR as inadmissible
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pursuant to the Deadman's statute, Idaho Code § 9-202(3), I.R.E. 601 (b) and as inadmissible
hearsay; the Trial Court did allow Stockton to argue the intent provided justification. R. p.1318.

1.

The Deadman's statute and IRE 601 prohibits the ROFR Testimony.

The following persons cannot be witnesses: ... 3. Parties or assignors ofparties to an action
or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an
executor or administrator, upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to
any communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death of such deceased
person.
LC.§ 9-202 (2020). Similarly, the rules of evidence also limit such testimony. I.R.E. 601 (2020).
Stockton/Brinlaneyer argue err by not allowing introduction of the ROFR. In fact, the
Court ruled exactly as Appellants argue she should have- "The Court will not allow any hearsay

statements allegedly made by Bill Warren, deceased, or by Mr. Brinkmeyer Js mother. However,

tltis testimony is potentially relevant (and may be allowed) on tlte issue of Stockton's and
Brinkmeyer's intent as it relates to the plaintiff's claims for tortious interference." R. p.1318
(emphasis added). Appellants got exactly what they requested - the opp01iunity to argue the ROFR
justified their conspiracy to tortiously interfere. The Comi permitted the desired testimony but
disregarded the legal conclusion Appellants' urged.

2.

The Court correctly ruled the ROFR violates the statute of frauds.

Appellants argue the oral ROFR is "just as valid as a written" agreement and claim the
Statute of Frauds is only a defense as between the Estate and Stockton. However, "[a]n agreement

for the sale ofreal property is invalid unless the agreement or some note or memorandum thereof
be in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent." Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102
Idaho 187, 190 (Idaho 1981); I.C. § 9-503; and I.C. § 9-505. ROFR's must adequately and
precisely describe the real prope1iy to be conveyed. Nicholson v. Coeur D'Alene Placer Mining
Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 8 83 (Idaho20 l 7)(An oral agreement to sell to tenants '' the property currently
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used' if ever sold is too vague).
Here, Stockton claims an oral agreement he could buy "any land' Wanen owned, then
later testified it was "waterfront" land. Tr.p. 24-25, 569-70 The Court allowed him to testify, but
rejected the argument it was a "superior" claim to Tricore's rights. The Com1 properly admitted
the ROFR for the limited purposes of Stockton's/Brinkmeyer' s claim of intent. The Court properly
rejected Appellants argument it justified interference with and rejected the ROFR as "superior" to
Tricore's PSA.

3.

Regardless of Stockton's alleged ROFR, Tricore is a bona fide
purchaser entitled to enforce the Contract

Appellants arguments fail because Tricore is a bona fide good faith purchaser for value.
Tricore received a preliminary title report along with other documents and no evidence of any
ROFRor other similar encumbrance of record existed. Ex. 31 and 32, COE pp. 65-66, 160-166,
The listing broker was never informed of any such right. Tr. pp. 379-80. A real property interest
includes an executory contract for the pmchase of real prope1ty. Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240,
245 (Idaho App 1984). A purchaser without actual or constructive notice of an unrecorded claim,
such that a "reasonable investigation" would not disclose the existence of such unrecorded claim,
is a bona fide purchaser for value. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 858-59 (Idaho 2010). Tricore
was a bona fide purchaser for value who negotiated and entered into the PSA in good faith with
no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the Stockton claim. Appellants had legal remedies
available to enforce the ROFR rather than conspiring to tortiously interfere. See e.g. Hancock v.
Dusenberry, 110 Idaho 147, 152 (Idaho App. 1986). Instead, Appellants chose to use improper
means by resorting to self-help.

4.

The Trial Court properly held the ROFR was inadmissible hearsay.

The Trial Com1 properly applied IRE 801, et. seq. to exclude hearsay statements by Bill
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Warren who died in 1993 or his wife who died in 2003.

The Court also properly excluded

statements by Mrs. Brinkmeyer before she passed away in 2003. IRE 801. "[DJecisions regarding
the admission of evidence are reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Mulford

v. Union Pacific R.R., 156 Idaho 134, 138 (Idaho 2014). The statements were clearly hearsay.

B.

The Trial Court Correctly Found the Tricore PSA did not violate the Statute
of Frauds.

((The statute ofji·auds is intended to protect against fraud; it is not intended as an escape
route for persons seeking to avoid obligations undertaken by or imposed upon them. " Russell

v. Russell, 99 Idaho 151, 153 (1978)(emphasis added). Appellants tried to use the Statute of
Frauds as an escape route to avoid accountability for_ the Estate's promises and
Stockton/Brinkmeyer' s interference. The Trial Court correctly rejected this ruse.

1. The Estate Acknowledged The Tricore PSA and That Tricore Would Close.
[T]he object of the statute [ offrauds] is to prevent potential fraud by forbidding disputed
assertions ofenumerated kinds ofcontracts without any written basis. This purpose is fully
satisfied when the parties themselves accept the contract and mutually perform iL For
the same reason, the statute offrauds is inapplicable when a contract, although notfully
petformed by both sides, is mutually acknowledged to exist.

Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 874 (1991).

The Estate confirmed the agreement and

acknowledged the Tricore PSA transaction would be completed. See R. p. 290 - "As far as we
knew that whole thing was going to go eventually." Tr. pp. 84-85. Dan Warren testified the
1

closing of the Tricore PSA was discussed at the September 2 "meeting". Tr. pp. 85-85; 88-89.
This meeting, which included Stockton's lawyers, was where the Estate signed the
Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and Indemnification Agreement. R. p. 290. Prior to litigation, the
Estate never claimed the legal description was deficient. For sufficiency of a legal description,
Justice Bistline explained: "[a] description is siif.ficiently definite if it evidences the common intent
ofthe parties to deal with respect to a particular piece ofproperty."
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Russell v. Russell, 99 Idaho

151, 155 (1978), J. Bistline concurring specially. Here, the legal description evidenced the
common intent and the Estate testified the transaction would close.

2. The Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA Closed Using A Description "Retaining and
Reserving" A Parcel To be Created.
The Stockton/Brinkmeyer closing was a mere tln·ee days prior to the Tricore PSA closing date.
The legal description was sufficiently definite for the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA to successfully
close using a nearly identical legal description. See Ex. 2, COE p. 92. The description was jointly
drafted by the Estate and Stockton's counsel. Ex. 301, COE p. 786. Unlike the Tricore PSA, the
Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA required the Estate to create the waterfront parcel(s). The parcel
creation was not done prior to the September 6, 2016 closing.

Ex. 81, COE p. 961-965.

Nonetheless, the legal description was sufficient for the u·ansaction to be closed and the property
transferred. It was only after Stockton/Brinkmeyer were sued that Stockton's lawyer claimed the
Tricore PSA's description was not "precise" enough.

3. The Description of the Property in the Tricore PSA Identified the Quantity, Identity
or Boundaries of the Property.
Appellants did not quote the actual legal description.
Tlte Real Estate subject matter of tit is agreement is modified and shall be increased and sltall
include Parcel A, to be the following:

PARCEL A:
A tract of land along with the shore ofPriest Lake, being Government Lot 4 except the
East 424 Feet thereof, and except Tax Parcels 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31, all in Township59
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho. Said tract
containing approximately 22.8 acres, more or less.
PARCELB:
A tract of land along the shore of Priest Lake, being the West 653 feet of Government
Lot 3 and the East 424 feet of Government Lot 4, of Section 9, Township 59 North,
Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho. Said tract containing
approximately 20.00 acres, more or less.
PARCEL C:
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A tract of land along the shore of Priest Lake, being the West 547 feet of Government
Lot 2 and the East 719 feet of Government Lot 3, of Section 9, Township 59 North,
Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho. Said tract containing
approximately 20. 00 acres, more or less.
Ex. 213, COE p. 342-343 if3(emphasis added). Like the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA, the Tricore
PSA complied with the Statute of Frauds and included the material terms of the agreement along
with the legal description for the property to be conveyed.
4. The Tricore PSA Sufficiently Identified the Real Property to be Conveyed.

a. The Tricore PSA identified the legal descriptions for the property to be
purchased.
Appellants conflate and confuse the Tricore PSA provisions to try to create an issue that
never existed. However, a subjective interpretation of a contract cannot create an ambiguity where
one does not exist. Inst_ead, a contract is to be interpreted based on its plain meaning. The purpose
of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the parties at the time the contract was
entered. Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607 (2002). If the intent cannot be
ascertained from the evidence, any ambiguity will be construed against the drafter. Sinclair Mktg,
Inc. v. Siepe1i, 107 Idaho 1000, 1005, n. 5 (1985). Here, the intent was to transfer the property
described in, 3 then Tricore would provide development services for the Estate. Any ambiguity,
should be construed against the Estate instead of finding the contract unenforceable.
The Tricore PSA's plain language confams the property being sold was described by the
detailed legal descriptions in if3. Ex. 213, R. p. 342-343. The property description was followed
by ,r 4 identifying the money to be paid for the prope1iy described by the legal description. This
provides a description so the "quantity, identity or boundaries of the property can be determined."
City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd. Co., 13 5 Idaho 23 9, 244 (2000). "A description

contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity, or boundaries ofproperty can
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be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it
refers." Id. Since the legal descriptions provide the quantity, identity and boundaries for the
property, the Tricore PSA satisfies the Statute of Frauds.

b. Tricore's agreement to purchase the property and then develop a lot for the
Estate does not violate the statute of frauds.
Tricore agreed to purchase the real property described in ,r 3 for $2,400,000. Then, as a
separate part of the agreement, the parties agreed Tricore would develop the property, including
the lots described in

,r

5 and provide those to the Sellers. Ex. 213, COE p. 344. Considering

freedom to Contract and the parties intent, this hybrid agreement makes sense. The Estate wanted
to sell the property but also wanted to have a lot developed for themselves. They expressed this
intent to Stockton when they tried to sell him the property in 2014. Ex. 11, COE p. 113. The
Tricore PSA separated the property transfer provision from the obligation to develop and provide
a lot.
Hybrid development agreements like this have been found to satisfy the statute of frauds
and provide an adequate legal description. See In re Ricks, 433 B.R. 806 (2010) and In re Old
Cutters, Inc., 488 B.R. 130 (2012) affirmed by In re Old Cutters, Inc., 2014 WL 1319854 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Judge Lodge). The In re Ricks Court considered whether a similar transaction for the
purchase of land as a component of "a larger real estate developmenf' satisfied the statute of
frauds. In Re Ricks, 433 B.R. at 820. The comi explained agreements where the sale of real
prope1iy is combined with an obligation to develop the property constitute hybrid agreements. "In

this sense, the Spur Ranch Agreement is a sort ofhybrid - a combination of both the purchase/sale
of land, and a personal services contract requiring Ricks to complete the development, in many
respects, to Kastera 's standards." Id. The Court explained why agreements like this provide a
sufficient legal description to be enforced.
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But defects like those in the Frasure contract are not present in the
Spur Ranch Agreement. Not only can the general location of the
subject property be ascertained from the face of the Spur Ranch
Agreement, the precise quantity of building lots and the exact outer
boundaries of the project are clear from the legal description
attached to the contract. Put another way, in their contract, Ricks
and Kastera did not stop at inclusion of a physical address for the
property, as did the parties in Frasure; rather, tltey provided the
existing legal description of tlte entire property, and identified a
specific amount of completed lots that were to be developed and
sold by Ricks to Kastera within each portion of that parcel. In this
fashion, the Court concludes the parties have described the location,
quantity, and boundaries of the property to be sold. [citation
omitted]. Indeed, since the Spur Ranclt property had yet been
finally platted, tltey /tad no cltoice but to rely upon a legal
description of the whole property supplemented by other informal
In tlte Court's view, under the
identifying information.
circumstances, neither Ricks nor Kastera could ltave been more
precise in describing tlte subject property, given the legal
description of the property that was available to them at the time.

****
The Court concludes, under these facts, that the Spur Ranch
Agreement contains a sufficient description of the property to be
sold to Kastera to satisfy the Idaho statute offrauds.
Id. at p. 820-821(emphasis added). Similarly, the In re Old Cutters, Inc. Court found that in a
development situation it was sufficient for the statute of frauds if the parties "adequately

describe tlte location, quantity and exterior boundaries of tlte Property." In re Old Cutters, Inc.,
488 B.R. 130, 142 (2012)(emphasis added). The Old Cutters, Inc. Court's decision was upheld
by Judge Lodge, who agreed with the analysis underlying the ruling. See In re Old Cutters, Inc.,
2014 WL 13198 54 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 2014 )(Judge Lodge pointed out that since no final
subdivision plat had been approved or recorded, the parties could satisfy the statute of frauds by
identifying the prope1iy as sufficiently as possible given the early stages of development.)
Like In re Ricks and In re Old Cutters, Inc., the Tricore PSA described by legal description
the outer boundaries of the real property being sold. The agreement then required Tricore provide

-16 -

- the service of developing a parcel (or two parcels) for the Sellers. The location of the lot/lots
within the development was specifically identified - "adjacent to Tax 31 between the existing

access road and the lake." Ex. 213, COE p. 344. When combined with the reference to the
extrinsic evidence of the "Bonner County Planning and Zoning provisions and approval,"
Appellants argument over the shape of the lot fails. The lot to be developed is more defined than

in In re Ricks or In re Old Cutters, Inc. since the specific lot and the basis upon which it would be
developed is defined. Id. Because Tricore' s development had not been platted at the time of the
PSA, "they had no choice but to rely upon a legal description of the whole property supplemented

by other informal identifying information." In re Ricks, 433 B.R. at 820-821. To attempt to do
otherwise would have been in violation of Bonner County zoning laws. Stockton/Brinkmeyers'
argument would have a chilling effect on the freedom to contract in the State of Idaho. It would
prevent families from being able to enter into agreements where they need to sell a portion of their
property but do not have the sophistication or resources to perform the development or division of
the property.

c. The Tricore PSA is Distinguishable from the Lexington Heights Contract.
Lexington Heights Dev., LLC. V. Crandlemier, 140 Idaho 276,281 (2004) involved facts
very different from the Tricore PSA. The Lexington agreement was not a hybrid agreement
requiring development services like the Tricore PSA. Nor did it include a legal description of the
boundaries. In Lexington Heights, the contract at issue did not include legal descriptions. Instead,
it described the property as "the real property situated in Ada County, Idaho located at 1400 West

Floating Feather Road, consisting of approximately ninety (90) acres ... , however excluding the
residential dwelling (which will include no more than jive acres) and improvements identified
below (herein called 'Premises')." Lexington Heights, 92 P.3d at 528. Unlike the Tricore PSA,
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the portion of the property to be reserved was not tied to development standards. The court found
the agreement unenforceable because it did not contain a sufficient legal description of the property
being sold. The Idaho Supreme Court explained "the issue with respect to the statute offrauds is

not whether the parties had agreed upon the precise dimensions of the property to be sold. It is
whether the written memorandum contains an adequate description of the property to be sold." Id.
at 533. In contrast, the Tricore PSA identified by legal description the property to be sold. Ex.
213, COE p. 342-343. The service of developing the lot identified the type oflot to be developed,
its exact location and insured at least 200' of waterfront.
Based on all of the foregoing, Judge Buchanan did not err by finding the Tricore PSA did
not violate the Statute of Frauds and dismissing the affirmative defense.

C.

The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in determining the Tricore
PSA was enforceable and represented a meeting of the minds.

The "meeting of the minds" argument is the product of trial strategy and not the parties'
belief at the time. Dan Warren confirmed the Estate knew it had a contract with Tricore and that

"as far as we knew, that the whole thing was going to go eventually". Tr. pp. 90-91.
1.

Mort's unilateral mistaken belief of whether the East 318 feet was
included is not evidence of a lack of meeting of the minds.

The Estate agreed to sell property to Tricore described by complete legal description. (See
preceding Section B). By signature, Tricore established the intent to contract and a meeting of the
minds. A person who has executed a contract is presumed capable of understanding the nature
and effect of such contract. As a corolla1y, a written contract cannot be avoided by one of the
parties to it on the ground that he signed it; failing to read the contract or have it read to him or
otherwise inform himself as to the nature, terms and conditions of the contract. Liebelt v. Lei belt,
118 Idaho 845, 848 (1990).

"Under Idaho law, a contracting party who makes a mistake

unilaterally cannot rescind or modify the contract unless there has been a misrepresentation or
knowledge of the mistake by the other party." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 28 (Idaho
App.1997). The Estate did not claim Tricore's communications in late July and early August,
2016 constituted a mutual mistake. Instead, the Estate argues Tricore' s misunderstanding as to
whether the 318 feet was included is a unilateral mistake eliminating the meeting of the minds.
This argument, that unilateral mistakes may permit reformation of a contract was rejected. "Under
Idaho lawJ a contracting party who makes a mistake unilaterally cannot rescind or modify the
contract unless there has been a misrepresentation or knowledge ofthe mistake by the other party."
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 28 (Idaho App.,1997).
In order to justify its breach, the Estate is trying to use what would be a potential shield by
Tricore, as a sword to justify the conspiracy to breach the Tricore PSA. No facts support the
argument that Tricore's mistaken understanding as to the 318 feet establishes a lack of meeting of
the minds. Further, the testimony from Mort and Lempesis establishes that both simply considered
Mort's mistake on the frontage an opportunity to try to negotiate modifications of price or terms.
If they had considered it a lack of a meeting of the minds, they could have asserted Tri core's right

to rescind the contract and demanded a refund of their eamest money. As Cliff Mort testified,
regardless, Tricore was ready, willing and able to complete the purchase based on the existing
written description.
2.

The witnesses subjective interpretations of the 200 feet of waterfront to
be retained by the Estate does not render the Tricore PSA
unenforceable.

A signed, written agreement establishes a meeting of the minds occurred. "Formation of
a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of
mutual intent to contract." Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702 (1989). "This
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manifestation takes the form of offer and acceptance." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family

Irrevocable Trnst, 144 Idaho 233, 238 (2007). Whether the parties written agreement reflects a
meeting of the minds is judged on "objective manifestations, not by any uncommunicated beliefs.
mental reservations, or subjective interpretations or intentions... 'Whether there was a meeting of
the minds is an objective inquiry that does not focus on the subjective beliefs or intentions of [the
parties]."' Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, 159 (Idaho 2018). Formation of an

enforceable contract occurs when an "objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding
that afully enforceable contract has been made, even if the ojferee subjectively does not intend to
be legally bound." Id.

Tricore and the Estate knew, at the time of contract, that what was agreed to was the legal
description unambiguously stated in the PSA. Mr. Finney's subjective interpretation of how to
implement the "carve-out" language (drafted by him), has no bearing on the enforceability of the
PSA. The Tri core PSA provided complete legal descriptions of Parcels A, B and C to be conveyed.
(See Section B above). Appellants' use Mort's interpretation of15 against Finney's interpretation
of 15, Tr. pp. 259-61; 786-7 Both are subjective interpretations of how the carve-out could be
implemented- i.e. Sellers "retaining" title or Buyer to "create in compliance with Bonner county
Planning and Zoning provisions and approval" and re-conveying to the Estate. The result is the

same, but it is not evidence of no meeting of the minds. Instead, the evidence of a meeting of the
minds on material contract terms is measured by the objective manifestations in the contract
language on material terms of price, terms and a description of the property to be sold. See General
Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 857 (Idaho 1999).
The contract certainty was Warrens would receive 200 feet of lalcefront in the form of one
(1) or two (2) lots compliant with Bonner County Planning and Zoning requirements. This is
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precisely the language and result the Estate achieved with the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA, except
without county compliance. Tr. p. 784. The Tricore PSA was not rendered unenforceable based on
two (2) differing, subjective interpretations of how to achieve performance where the "adequacy
ofperformance" could be ascertained by the end result. 4

D.

The Trial Court properly weighed the evidence and determined Tricore did
not repudiate the PSA.

At trial, facts were established defeating the repudiation defense and supporting the Court's
decision including the following:
1.

Appellants' own agreements make no mention of Tricore's repudiation,
only that the Estate must repudiate its obligations with Tricore. Ex. 8. R.
pp. 106-108.

2.

The Trial Court correctly made findings of fact of the failed modification
negotiations between Tricore and the Estate through counsel over price,
purchase of fill dirt and other matters, none of which rose to a repudiation
from Tricore. R. pp. 1998-2000.

3.

The Court correctly rejected Finney's "interpretation" of the August 17,
2016 email as repudiation and noted it was merely attempted modification
negotiations. R. 2000; Ex. 224, pp. 366-367.

4.

Tricore continued expending funds in due diligence and assessment of the
property immediately before, during and after the August 17th email Finney
interpreted as a repudiation. Ex. 225, pp.368-9; Ex. 217, P. 360; Ex. 220,
pp. 362; Ex. 221, Pp. 363; Ex. 222, p. 364.

5.

Mort's communication to counsel, Mr.Lempesis, reflects Mort's attempt to
renegotiate terms, not repudiate the contract-" ... this would be our proposal
to move the project forward ... " R. 224, p. 366.

6.

Finney's own draft of an agreement sent to Brinkmeyer on August 3 pt
acknowledges Tricore's contract is in first position, twenty two (22) days
after the August 9th meeting at which Finney claims Tricore repudiated.

1.

The Facts do not support Appellants' claim of repudiation.

Notably, the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and Indemnification Agreements make no mention of any legal deficiency
in the Tricore PSA as justification for conspiring to breach it.

4
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To repudiate a contract, a party must make "a positive, unconditional, and unequivocal

declaration offixed purpose not to perform the contract in any event or at any time." Minidoka
Irr. Dist. V. Dep't of the Interior. United States, 154 F.3d 924, 926 (1998). See also Farnsworth
on Contracts, §8.21 at 479 (1990)("Furthermore, courts have required that the act make the

promisor 's performance impossible, so that conduct that indicates mere unwillingness is not
enough.") Because anticipatory repudiation "works harsh results," its application requires clear
and convincing evidence and the statement must be one that unequivocally states the promisor
will not or cannot perform. See Regional Enterprises, Inc. v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Assoc., 352 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1965).
Dan Warren's testimony confirms the "repudiation" defense was invented by Stockton's
lawyers for litigation. When they signed documents to sell to Stockton/Brinkmeyer, the Estate,
along with everyone in the September 2 meeting, understood the Tricore PSA had not been
repudiated and that it would close eventually. Tr. p. 90-91. It was telling Dan Wat-ren believed
they were still selling the property to Tricore even as he walked into the September 2, 2016 meeting
with Chris Wan-en, John Finney, Brinkmeyer, and Attorneys John Drake and Jim McPhee. Tr. pp.
88-9; 90-91. Wanens were presented for the first time the Purchase and Sale Agreement and
Indemnification Agreement obligating them to "repudiate" the Warren-Tricore PSA. Tr. pp. 8081; p. 83, 11. 10-21. Dan Warren testified neither he nor his brother, Cln·is, ever discussed this,
before the meeting, or at the meeting. Tr., p. 89, 11. 10-13. Dan Warren was ''bothered' by the
Estate breaching its obligation to Tricore. Tr. pp. 84-85. This establishes the Personal
Representatives knew on September 2nd and 6th, the Estate was breaching their contract with
Tricore, not that Tri core had repudiated the contract. The language of the documents, drafted by
Attorneys John Finney, Jim McPhee, Gary Brajcich and John Drake on behalf of the Appellants,
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carefully articulates the Estate's duty to repudiate its obligations under the Tricore PSA. Ex. 8,
COE p. 177. The agreement acknowledges the sale will result in a breach or violation oflaw, "as
expressly contemplated by the Real Estate Sale Indemnification Agreement." Ex. 2, COE p.173.

The Indemnification Agreement acknowledges the Estate "entered into a contract to sell" to
Tricore, "has agreed to repudiate their obligations under the Warren-Tricore PSA," and that
repudiation "may expose" the Estate to liability for a breach of the Tricore PSA. Ex. 8, COE p.
177.

Such language would have been unnecessary if the Estate truly believed Tricore had

repudiated.
th
The repudiation defense relied on the testimony of Finney' s description of the August 9

meeting with Charles Lempesis. Tr. 828-9. Finney did not testify Tricore stated unequivocally an
intent to repudiate by communicating it would not go forward with the sale. Instead, Finney states
only he "understood" they had repudiated. Tr. 830. However, the Estate's conduct after that is not
consistent with this assertion. Finney's understanding was properly rejected by the Court for
th
several reasons: 1) Mort sent a follow up email on August 16 to Finney through counsel,

Lempesis, outlining his proposals to renegotiate the terms and inviting a response; 2) On August
17th Lempesis followed up by email with "Lets tallr'; 3) Mort's proposal included specific
proposed revisions of the existing contract not a new contract (to extend closing, additional
th
deposits, as well as change of terms); 4) There were two August 26 conversations between Finney

and Lempesis (one of which Mort attended) about adding the 318 feet to purchase, the Estate's tax
th
issues and purchase of fill dirt and water system; 5) The August 30 discussions between Lempesis

and Finney in which the Estate refused to reduce the price but offers to sell fill dirt and counters
for more earnest money, essentially declining to renegotiate price terms as a modification but
indicating a willingness to consider other modifications. R. p. 1999-2002; and, 6) Mr. Finney
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clearly lrnew on August 31 st (three weeks after he claims Tricore repudiated during the meeting on
August 9th) that Tricore had not repudiated because Finney drafted an initial Purchase Agreement
for Brinkmeyer that acknowledged the contract would be in "second position" behind the

"existing" Tricore PSA. The Trial Court noted in her conclusions that after hearing six (6) days
of testimony (including Finney's beliefTricore might not perform), numerous exhibits and careful
review of both, there was no testimony or documents to support a finding "that Tricore ever made

any positive statement or declaration that it would not or could not perform its contractual duties."
R. p. 2008. This is consistent with Idaho law, namely Minidoka In-. Dist cited above. The Trial
Comi properly rejected Finney's testimony as contradicted by his own documents and the
testimony of Dan Warren. The Trial Court's findings should be affirmed.

2.

Tricore's continued negotiations and due diligence do not constitute
repudiation of the contract.

A repudiation is 'a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the obligor will
commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach[]' A
repudiating party's language 'must be sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean
that the party will not or cannot perform. ' Further, a statement of repudiation must threaten a
breach ofsufficient gravity that, "ifthe breach actually occurred, it would ofitselfgive the obligee
a claim for damages for total breach. ... '"
Trumble v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 456 P.3d 201, 215-16 (Idaho,
2019).
Attempting to negotiate a modification while a binding agreement is in place does not meet
the high standard for repudiation, nor should it. Mr. Lempesis, who acted as counsel or partner in
a billion dollars of development in his 40 year career, testified trying to re-negotiate already
binding terms may never end until closing of the proposed sale. Tr. p. 1023-4, 1048-51. A
willingness to negotiate an offer of perfo1mance different than the terms of the agreement
demonstrates the offering party's willingness to abide by the contract and does not result in
anticipatory breach. See Regional Enterprises, 352 F .2d 768, 775 ( 9th Cir., 1965). In addition,
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when there is a disagreement as to the meaning of terms in a contract, one party's offer to perform
in accordance with his interpretation is not itself an anticipatory breach. Lowenstein v. Federal
Rubber Co., 85 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1936). See also: Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v.
Town of Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th 435,468 (2010).
The Appellants, in their msh to have the Estate sell the property to them before Tricore's
closing , negotiated a written term of their contract that the Estate must "repudiate their obligations

under the Warren-Tricore PSA upon the execution" of the indemnification agreement and PSA.
Ex. 2, COE p.173; Ex. 8, COE p. 177. No mention is made in the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA or
Indemnification Agreement of repudiation by Tricore.
The Court is vested with the discretion to determine witness credibility during trial.
The determination of a witness's credibility can be based upon observations of the witness's
demeanor while testifying and/or upon inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the witness's testimony
or facts that conflict with that testimony. Fairchild v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 159 Idaho 208,
211-12 (Idaho 2015). The evidence sunounding the sale to Stockton/Brinkmeyer supports the
Trial Court's conclusion there was no repudiation by Tri core.

3. The Estate is barred from claiming repudiation.
The "transferring or contracting to transfer to a third person an interest in specific land,

goods or in any other, thing essential for the substantial performance of his contractual duties"
constitutes an anticipatory repudiation which is a total breach of contract. Restatement (First) of
Contracts §318 (1932)(b). The Estate contracted to transfer the property at issue on September 2
and then closed on September 6. Supra. The Tricore PSA called for a closing on September 9,
with the right to extend closing to October 7, 2016. Ex. 213, COE p. 342-345; COE p. 90. Tricore
exercised its right to extend the closing and sought assurances from the Estate, when unbeknownst

- 25-

to Tricore, the Estate had already sold to Stockton/Brinkmeyer. Ex. 9 and 10, COE pp. 110-111.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Appellants could not raise the repudiation defense. "Even where

the defendant has repudiated the contract and has rejected a proffered tender of payment, the
party seeking pe1formance must show it is ready, willing and able to perform its obligations under
the contract in the event that specific pe1formance is ordered." Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993,
997-98 (Idaho App. 1995). This principal of showing a pruty's ability to perform is applied
equally to a party seeking relief from the contract based upon a repudiation defense. A defendant
raising repudiation as a defense must show "that he would have been ready and willing to have

pe1formed the contract, if repudiation had not occurred."

United California Bank v. The

Prudential''Ins. Co. of America, et. al., 681 P.2d 390, 440-441 (1984).

Because the Estate

transfe11'ed the Property on September 6, it was impossible for the Estate to perform as required
by the Tricore PSA.

4.

Defendants did not present evidence of repudiation of Tricore's
interest in the real property which satisfied the statute of frauds.

Tricore and the Estate had a valid PSA for the purchase of real property. Because the
Earnest Money had become non-refundable, Tricore's PSA created an interest in the property.
Defendants failed to present evidence of alleged "repudiation" eliminating that interest which
complied with the Statute of Frauds. See LC. § 9-503. Any repudiation would have to comply
with the Statute of Frauds. A valid land sale agreement provides the purchasers with an interest
in the real prope1iy. See generally, SMS Fin., LLC v. CBC Fin. Corp., 2017 UT 90, ~ 8; and Land
Fund, Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 237 Ga. 227,229 (1976). An earnest money agreement is a
valid contract enforceable by specific performance. See Fulle1ion v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 823
(Idaho 2006). The seller of real property retains title to the property while the sale is being
processed, but title is effectively held for the benefit of the buyer, to whom the title of property
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will pass to when the contract is carried out. Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546, 549-50 (Utah
1991). In arriving at this conclusion, courts apply the doctrine of equitable conversion . See Mueller
v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208,215 (2015). "An equitable conversion takes place when a contract for the

sale ofreal property becomes binding on the parties." Id.; First Sec. Banlc ofldaho, Nat'l Ass'n v.
Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657 (1967). This includes interests in real property that can only be created
or transferred except by operation of law or by conveyance or instrument in writing subscribed by
the party (or his agent) creating or transferring the interest in question. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho
872, 874 (Ct. App. 1991 ). The sale of property must be in writing and must include all conditions,
terms, descriptions necessary, and signed by both parties to constitute a contract. Callies v. O'Neal,
147 Idaho 841, 847 (2009). Logically, if a writing is required to create the transfer or conveyanc e
of property then a repudiation of the agreement must also be in writing. Collins v. Allied Pharmacy
Mgmt., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 929,934 (Tex. App. 1994); and Petrohawk Properties, L.P. v. Jones, 455
S.W.3d 753, 764 (Tex. App. 2015) (finding any change to an agreement subject to the statute of
frauds must also be in writing). Here, Appellants argue repudiation of an interest in real property
by a conversatio n and an email which discuss negotiating a modificatio n of the existing agreement.
Neither meets the statute of frauds.

5.

The contractual remedies were ignored by the Estate, if they
believed Tricore had repudiated the PSA.

The claim of repudiation is also not supported by the Estate's conduct in regard to the
Tricore PSA. Section 25 of the Tricore PSA sets forth:

BUYER defaults in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER has the option of: 1)
ACCEPTING THE Earnest Money as liquidated damages or 2) pursuing any other lawful right or
remedy to which SELLER may be entitled. If SELLER elects to proceed under 1), SELLER shall
make demand upon the holder of the Earnest Money .... "
Ex. 1, COE pp. 80. Here, the Estate did neither and instead attempted to return Tricore's earnest
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money. Ex. 9, COE p. 110. IfTricore had repudiated, the contractual remedy would have been to
retain the Earnest Money and give notice under the contract. Instead, the Estate negotiated a sale
agreement and indemnification with Stockton/Brinlaneyer that closed within four (4) days and
obligated the Estate to repudiate the Tricore PSA. All of this was done while the Estate and
Stockton/Brinkmeyer conspired to keep their actions of breaching the Tricore PSA and closing
their sale a secret until after "we close this afternoon" and not to offer Tricore any compensation
until we "see what they [Tricorej do". Ex. 4,5 and 6, COE pp. 793-797. The Estate's conduct
was contrary to any assertion that Tricore repudiated.

E.

The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in concluding there was a
violation of the ICP A.

The purpose of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") is "to protect both consumers

and businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices
in the conduct of trade or commerce ... " I. C. § 48-601. The Idaho CPA applies to an isolated sale
of property, ifit is not the sale of one's residence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d
356 (2004).
Appellants conclusory assertion their actions were not deceptive ignores the Trial Court's
findings and the evidence. The Trial Court found that on September 1, the Estate ananged a

"tentative

meeting with Chuck Lempesis for

September 6 without mentioning the

Stockton/Brinkmeyer negotiations." R. p. 2002-2003. Then, on September 2, after the Estate
signed the Stockton/Brinkmeyer PSA and Indemnification Agreement, the Estate indicated it

"could not confirm" a meeting on September 6, 2016. R. p. 2003. See also, Exs. 45 and 46, COE
p.168-169. After the Stockton/Brinlaneyer PSA closed on September 6, the Estate informed
Chuck Lempesis it had decided to "proceed in a different direction." R. p. 2004. The Estate did
not disclose the Estate had just sold the propetty. R. p. 2004. Nor did the Estate disclose the sale
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on September 7 when Chuck Lempesis emphasized Tricore was prepared to close "as is." R. p.
2004. The evidence at trial confirmed the Estate's deceit occurred before the Tricore PSA closing
date and after the Estate had actually sold the property. It also confirmed the deceit was directed
by Stockton's lawyers. See Ex. 6, COE p. 793 - "One, other point, maybe send to Chuck after we

close this afternoon.'' and Ex. 5, COE p. 797 - "Only question is should we delete the last
paragraph re reimbursement. I would preferjust taking that paragraph out and see what they do. ''
All of this evidence supports the Trial Court's conclusion the actions by the Estate were

"knowingly misleading and deceptive and constitute a violation ofIdaho Code§ 48-603(17)." R.
p. 2019.

F.

The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in concluding Stockton and
Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the Tricore/Warren PSA.

As it relates to the Court's finding for Tricore on its Tortious Interference With A Contract
claim, Stockton/Brinkmeyer's appeal only raises issues as to the existence of a contract or business
expectancy element, the intentional interference element of the tort and the District Court's
conclusion Stockton/Brinkmeyer failed to prove their claim of justification. Wesco Autobody
Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 895 (2010).

1. Tricore Had a Valid Contract and Business Expectancy.
a. The Evidence Supported the District Court's Conclusion Tricore and The
Estate Had a Binding Written Contract.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer fail to address the substantial evidence confirming an enforceable
written contract was entered into by Tricore and the Estate on June 30, 2016. Ex. 213, COE p.
329-345; R. p. 1997. See also R. pps. 2005 - 2008. As a result, Stockton/Brinkmeyer fail to
establish the finding of the existence of a contract was not supported by evidence.

b. The Evidence Established Tricore Had a Business Expectancy.
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Regardless of Stockton/Brinkmeyer's after the fact attack on the validity of the Tricore
PSA, the evidence supported Tricore prevailing on its tortious interference claims. Tricore alleged
both Tortious Interference With a Contract and Tortious Interference with a Business Expectancy.
R. p. 28. To establish tortious interference with a business expectancy, an enforceable contract is
not needed, just a valid economic expectancy. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho
at 893. Thus, even if there were no enforceable contract, the record supported a finding of a valid
business expectancy. Ex. 213, COE pp. 329-345. This includes not only the contract itself, but
also the impeachment deposition testimony by the representatives of the Estate that regardless of
any after the fact argument over enforceability, the transaction was going to go forward. See Tr.
R. p. 90, 11. 8-25; p. 91, 11. 1-25 and p. 92, 11. 1-2. This business expectancy was interfered with by
Stockton/Brinkmeyer. Therefore, regardless of whether the contract was enforceable, the evidence
supported a finding the first element of Tortious Interference is supported by the evidence.

2. Stockton/Brinkmeyer Intentionally Interfered with Tricore's Business
Expectancy.
This was not two parties making "competing" offers for the same property in the open
market. Stockton/Brinlaneyer interfered after Tricore was back under contract for nearly tln·ee (3)
months, paid its earnest money which had become nonrefundable, had invested significant time
and money in feasibility since October 2015 and had complied with all of its obligations under the
Contract. It was only after Stockton/Brinkmeyer learned Tri core's development plans that they
decided to interfere. Stockton/Brinkmeyer's prior disinterest in the property evidences they only
cared about interfering with Tricore's development of the Property.
The timing of the interference, and the testimony and actions of Stockton/Brinkmeyer
confirm their motivations. Stockton explained on August 20, 2016 he learned the basic plan to
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develop the property. Tr., p. 515, 11. 19-25. Up until that meeting, he "didn't think that there was
anything that could be done with the Warren Estate wetlands." Id. But then he learned it could
be developed. After that meeting the intent was clear, Stockton intended to prevent Tricore from
developing the property. Tr., p. 516, 11. 1-9; p. 517, 11. 15-19, and p. 518, 11. 1-14. See also Ex. 41,
COE pp. 70-75; Ex. 39, COE p. 69. Stockton/Brinlaneyer intended to harm Mr. Mort and Tricore
by preventing him from pursuing his livelihood. Stockton/Brinkmeyer decided the best way to
"prevent it from being developed'' was "to purchase it''. TT, R. p. 544, 11. 11-25; p. 545, 11. 1-11.
A plaintiff may show the defendant's interference with another's
contractual relation is intentional if the actor desires to bring about
or "if he knows that the interference is certain or substantially
certain to occur as a result of his action.'' Highland Enter., Inc. v.
Barker. 133 Idaho 330, 340, 986 P.2d 996, 1006 (1999)(citing
Restatement (Second) ofTorts §766B emf. D (1977)). Intent can be
shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended
purpose and desire "but known to him to be a necessary
consequence of his action. "
BECO Const. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 723 (2008). T01tious interference with a
contract arises from either the defendant's "pursuit of an improper objective or harming the
plaintiffor the use ofwrongful means that in fact cause injury to plaintiff's contractual or business
relationship." Bliss, 121 Idaho at 285.
The Supreme Comt held Highland established intent because "with other's prospective
contractual relation is intentional

if the

actor desires to bring about or

if he knows that the

interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action." Highland
Enterprises v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340 (1999), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 cmt. d (1977). "Intent can be shown even if the inte1ference is incidental to the
actor's intended purpose and desire but known to him to be necessary consequence ofhis action."
Id. The Supreme Court held that concern for the environment was not a proper justification to
interfere with Highland's contract. Id. at 345.
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Here, Stockton/Brinkmeyer actively solicited, encouraged and facilitated the breach with
the Estate of the Tricore PSA. Ex. 8, COE p. 106-108; Ex. 5, COE p. 797 and Ex. 6, COE p. 793.
They did so for improper purposes and employed improper means. Their purpose was to deprive
Tricore of the opp01tunity to develop the property. In pursuing it, Stockton/Brinkmeyer took the
work Tri core put forth to figure out how to develop this property. Property which, prior to
Tricore's work, Stockton/Brinkmeyer did not believe could be developed.

The interference may be shown to be wrongful by proof that either:
(1) the interferer had an improper motive to harm the plaintiff; or
(2) the means used by the interferer to cause injury to the
prospective advantage were wrongful by reason of a statute,
regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established standard
of a trade or profession.
Syringa Networks, LLC. V. Idaho Department of Admin, 155 Idaho 55, 65 (2013)(citation
omitted).
a. The Evidence Established Stockton and Brinkmeyer Acted With
an Improper Purpose.

Stockton/Brinkmeyer elected not to purchase the Estate property despite it being directly
offered to each in 2014 and 2015, and openly marketed in 2015 and 2016. Supra.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer interfered for the improper purpose of harming Tri core by depriving Tricore
of the opportunity to develop the property.

"Malice in the sense of ill-will is not required to establish a primafac ie case." Barlow v.
International Harvester Corp., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974).

In this case,

Stockton/Brinkmeyer actions were done intentionally and with the knowledge it would hatm
Tricore,

by

depriving

it

of its

contractual

rights

and

development

opportunity.

Stockton/Brinkmeyer knew their goal of preventing development would harm Tricore, and Cliff
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Mort, a developer who feeds his family by doing projects like this one. The facts established the
interference was for an improper purpose.

b. The Evidence Established Stockton/Brinkmeyer Used Improper
means
Stockton/Brinkmeyer also used improper means to accomplish their interference:
Brinkmeyer not disclosing to Mort his decision to try to purchase the property during their
August meeting, after Tricore disclosed it had figured out how to develop the property.
Brinkmeyer's purpose was to determine Tricore's development plans and ability, since they did
not believe it could be developed. R. p. 2000
Stockton/Brinkmeyer directed the Warren Estate to "repudiate" their agreement. Supra.
Tricore was improperly led to believe that they were proceeding with the sale to Tricore
and a meeting would occur. Supra.
The Estate and Stockton/Brinkmeyer did not disclose to Tricore the property had been sold.
Tr., pp. 776, 11. 6-9.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer engaged in improper means when they violated industry and trade
standards by intentionally hiding the Stockton/Brinkmeyer negotiation and sale from the listing
agent. See Tr., p. 414, 11. 11-25; Tr. p. 415, 11. 1-25; and Tr., p. 416, 11. 8-15.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer engaged in improper means when they required the Estate to close
the sale prior to the closing date for the Tricore PSA in a meeting that Mr. Wan-en had no prior
notice of and was attended by Stockton, Brinkmeyer, McPhee, Drake, and Finney. Supra.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer engaged in improper means when they intentionally interfered in the
Tricore PSA then after the fact invented legal justifications unsupported by the actual facts,
pleadings or documents. This was confirmed by Mr. Warren's testimony confirming it was
discussed, with Counsel present, the Tricore contract was "going to go eventually ... " Tr., p. 9394.

c. Judge Buchanan Correctly Ruled the Interference was not
Justified.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer had no valid justification for the interference.

Even justifiable

conduct "is rendered unjustified where improper means are employed by the defendant." Highland
Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 344. The Cami properly disregarded the ROFR as justification. Stockton
was represented prior to the interference and there is no evidence a valid ROFR existed. R. p. 201.
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G. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in concluding Stockton and
Brinkme yer's actions constituted a civil conspiracy.
1. Appellants Waived the Issue of Whether a Party to a Contract Can be Held
Liable for Civil Conspiracy by failing to raise it below.

"With the exception of jurisdictional issues, an argument not raised below and not
supported in the briefs is waived on appeal." Minor Miracle Productions, LLC v. Starkey, 152
Idaho 333,336 (2012). For the first time on appeal, Appellants argue California law to claim there
can be no liability for civil liability for any party if one conspirator is a party to the contract.
Appellants did not raise this issue in their written closing arguments to the trial court.
Stockton/Brinkmeyer seek relief from beingjointly and severally liable for the Trial Court's award
of attorney fees and costs. The civil conspifacy makes the Defendants one for the purposes of
liability. Dalhquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 387 (1925). If successful, Stockton/Brinkmeyer
would leave the Estate liable for the attorney fees and costs awarded. It's unclear why the Estate
joins in this argument since it is against its interest to do so. In any event, because the issue was
not raised below, the Court should not consider the argument.
2. Appellants are Joint and Severally Liable for all Damages Resulting from
the Civil Conspiracy to Breach the Tricore Contract.

While conspiring with Stockton/Brinkmeyer, the Estate deceived Tricore by indicating it
was willing to meet and was going to proceed with the Tricore PSA. These false statements made
with the intent of "keeping Tricore (a fish) on the line" while negotiating another deal with
Stockton/Brinlaneyer, supported the civil conspiracy. The Estate's communications were
th
orchestrated between the Estate and Stockton/Brinlaneyer' s counsel prior to the September 6

closing to hide the sale until after it had closed. Exs. 4, 5, and 6, COE pp. 793-797. This was not
a mere breach of contract. Appellants entered into an agreement to breach Tricore' s contract
tluough the use of improper means and improper purpose to interfere with and breach Tricore's
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contract.
A civil conspiracy exists

"if there is an agreement between two or more to accomplish an

unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner." McPheters v.
Maile, 13 8 Idaho 3 91, 3 95 (2003). "The essence ofa civil conspiracy claim is the wrong committed

as the object or purpose of the conspiracy, not the existence of the conspiracy itself." Id. The
existence of a civil conspiracy "bears on the rules of evidence and the persons liable, including

holding one conspirator liable for the conduct of the other." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care,
Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 123 fn. 4,334 P.3d 780, 797 (2014). Establishing a civil
conspiracy makes all of the Defendants one for the purposes of liability. Dalhquist v. Mattson, 40
Idaho 378, 387 (1925).
The Trial Court correctly decided Appellants all conspired to breach the Tricore PSA,
resulting in joint and severally liability. Finding a civil conspiracy did not add any additional
damages or increase the damages awarded, it simply made the Appellants jointly and severally
liable. The trial court's decision is consistent with the underlying purpose of a civil conspiracy
claim in Idaho.
Relying on Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454 (1994),
Appellants claim that because the Estate was a party to the contract, Stockton/Brinkmeyer cannot
be held liable for civil conspiracy. However, the Applied Comt specifically stated non-parties
could be held liable for conspiring to interfere with the contract. Applied, 869 P.2d at 464.
Regardless of whether this Court chose to apply California law to prevent tort liability for the
Estate as part of the conspiracy, California law would have no effect on Stockton/Brinkmeyer's
liability. Id.
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Applied overturned California' s history of precedent allowing claims for civil conspiracy
to be brought against a party to his or her own contract who worked with a third-party to unite,
interfere and induce the breach of the contract. See Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App.
2d 50 (1963). The Applied Court relied heavily upon New York law. Applied, 869 P.2d at 462.
Recognizin g a split among jurisdiction s, California decided to follow New York because of the
shared statutory policy, "[p]unitive damages are not recoverabl e except in actions for breach of
obligations not arising from contract." Id. at 462-463. Idaho does not share this statutory policy
barring the recove1y of punitive damages in breach of contract claims. Instead, punitive damages
may be awarded in contract cases under ce1tain circumstances. Linscott v. Rainer Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 100 Idaho 854, 859-860 (1980). The Applied holding is inconsistent with Idaho law.
Consistent with the purpose of Idaho's civil conspiracy law, some of many cases
supporting liability in a civil conspiracy against a party to a contract who conspires with another
to induce the breach include: Wade v. Culp, 23 N.E.2d 615 (1939); Hendricks v. Forshey, 94
S.E. 747 (1918); Charles v. Texas Co., 18 S.E.2d 719(1942); Motley, Green & Co. v. Detroit
Steel & Spring Co., C.C., 161 F. 389, 397 (1908); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Iowa Fruit &
Produce Co., 112 F .2d 101 (8 th Cir. 1940). As one court conectly reasoned:

If it be an actionable wrong for a third person to interfere in a contract and induce one of
the parties thereto to break it to the injury of the other, can it be said it is not equally a
wrong for one of the parties to the contract to invite a third party to unite with him and
aid him in breaking the contract in such a way as possibly to escape liability in an action
for nonperformance and, gaining his consent, to act together in consummat ing their
agreement? There are many refinements in the lawJ necessarily so, but courts should be
as astute in applying well-known principles ofjustice to remedy wrongs as the
wrongdoer s are in devising schemes to perpetrate them.
Motely, 161 F. at 397. "Intentiona lly to do that which was calculatecl in the ordinmy course of
events, to damage, and which does in fact damage another in that other person's property or
tradeJ is actionable if done without just cause or excuse." Id. A breach of contract is unlawful,
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and it is "unlawful for others, without lawful excuse, to induce the maker ofa contract to break
it, or to aide him in its breach; and/or the maker and others to combine to break it is a
conspiracy, which entitles the other party to the contract to his action against the conspirators
for any damages he may sustain." Luke v. Du Pree, 124 S.E. 13, 16 (1924).

Idaho law does not support limiting liability to any of the parties participating in this
conspiracy. For liability, proving a claim for civil conspiracy operates to make all parties one and
holds all parties accountable for their coconspirators conduct. Dalhquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378,
387 (1925). Appellants' argument would defeat the purpose of the civil conspiracy claim.

H. The Trial Court's award of attorney fees and costs should be affirmed.
"Determinations as to prevailing party, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees and costs
are committed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court and will not be altered absent an abuse ofthat
discretion." Clarke v. Latimer, 437 P.3d 1, 4 (Idaho 2018)

1. Apportionment
"Thus, while the judge in his sound discretion must consider 'the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties ... and the extent to which each
party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims, ' he is not compelled to make a discrete award of
fees on each claim." Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,693 (Idaho App. 1984). The Court,

in its discretion, is to consider the "final judgment or result ofthe action in relation to the reliefsought
by the respective parties.'~ IRCP 54 (d)(l)(B). The Supreme court has directly refuted Appellants

argument about appo1iioning fees per claim or per defendant.

"When multiple claims and

counterclaims are at stake, 'the prevailing party question is examined and determined fi:om an overall
view. not a claim-by-claim analysis."' Clarke v. Latimer, 165 Idaho 1, 6 (Idaho 2018). Tricore

prevailed on all claims against Stockton, Brinkmeyer and PLBM. Tricore prevailed on all claims
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against the Estate except for the claim of fraud. When analyzed "from an overall view" the Court
awarded specific perfo1mance thereby unwinding the hurried September 6 transaction. The Court
colTectly concluded Tricore prevailed on its claims and the gravamen ofTricore's claim's arose from
the Tricore PSA, which was a commercial transaction.

2. Joint and several liability
Brinkmeyer argues t01tious interference claims cannot supp01i an award of attorney's fees in
contract or under Idaho Code 12-120(3), citing Bybee v. Isaac. Bybee was a claim for tortuous
interference with a non-compete clause in an employment contract and distinguishable from these
facts. In Bybee, as well as N01ihwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Space, which is cited in Bybee, the
underlying claim was to1tious· interference with a non-disclosure/proprietary information agreement
and non-compete agreement in the context of an employment relationship. The claims were based
upon the "statutory scheme" of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, not a commercial transaction. Northwest
Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service,136 Idaho 835, 842 (Idaho 2002). Likewise, the Court noted
Bybee' s claims against the third party to the commercial contract were tort, not contracts and declined

"to award Bybee Air attorney fees pursuant to IC.§ 12-120(3)" Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251,261
(Idaho 2008)
Here, the Court con-ectly found that Appellants conspired to breach and interfere with the
Tricore PSA and, thus, the commercial transaction was the gravamen ofTricore's claims. Appellants
5
argue a commercial h·ansaction must exist between all the parties for attorney fees to be awarded.

However, "Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies where "a 'commercial transaction' is integral to the

claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover," and "as long as a
commercial transaction is at the center ofthe lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney

Presumably, Appellants' strategy is to saddle the Estate with all liability, which calls into question the joint
representation and why the Estate joins this argument against its interests.

5
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fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in tort."
Reynolds v. Trout, 154 Idaho 21, 26-27 (2013).
From time to time the Court has denied fees under IC. § 12-120(3) on the commercial
transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort or because no contract was
involved. The commercial transaction grounds in IC. § 12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee
award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct (see Lettunich v. Key
Bank Nat'! Ass'n 141 Idaho 362, 369, 109 P.3d 1104, 1111 (2005)), nor does it require that
there be a contract. Any previous holdings to the contrary are overruled.
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-29 (Idaho 2007)(emphasis added). Blimka
makes clear the Court properly awarded fees and costs with joint and several liability, even though
no contract exists with Stockton/Brinkmeyer, based upon their conspiracy and tortious interference
with the Tricore PSA. The PSA is a commercial transaction and is the gravamen or "center of the
lawsuit" and always has been. The Court recognized this fact and correctly awarded fees and costs.

I. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in setting the amount of the
supersedeas bond.
The Court properly exercised discretion to place conditions upon the stay, order a Bond
to address damages and to enter an order which addressed the use, preservation and possession of
the property. See IAR 13(b)(8),(10), and (14). Staying specific perfonnance means Tricore is
being deprived from using a unique multimillion-dollar piece of property. Other than offering a
conclusory assertion, Brinkmeyer fails to explain why the Trial Court abused its discretion by
establishing a supersedeas amount that recognized there would be a loss of use of the property. A
bond to stay a judgment ordering the transfer of real property must provide compensation for
damages arising from the delay caused by the pending appeal. Moore v. Townsend, 577 F.2d 424,
426 (7th Cir. 1978). A supersedeas bond provides compensation for injuries which are the
"natural and proximate result of the stay." Id. at 426-27. The bond must secure the recovery for
"use and detention ofproperty, costs of action, costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay."
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Hackin v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty., 102 Ariz. 93, 95 (1967).
In Bell v. Dyck O'Neal, Inc., the Court required "a bond in the full amount ofthe judgment

because the proposed security in the form of real estate did not provide Appellee with any more
security

what Appellee

titan

already

holds."

Bell

v.

Dyck

O'Neal,

Inc.,

No.

00388SEPTTERM2015, 2017 WL 2991710, at *13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 14, 2017), cert.
dismissed, 173 A.3d 155 (2017) (emphasis added). Idaho comis also have insured the bond secures
the judgment creditor against waste by securing payment of "the value of the use and occupation

of the property from the time of the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof .. [and] the
payment of a deficiency arising upon the sale.'' Great American Indemnity Co. v. Bisbee, 59 Idaho
18, 19 (1938). Allowing Stockton/Brinkmeyer to simply keep the propetiy, while preventing
Tricore from using it would not have addressed the loss of use of the property. The evidence was
Tricore is deprived of using a $6,425,000 asset during the appeal. Interest for 18 months equals
$710,765.63. R. p. 2337-2339. Tricore also presented evidence of other damages. In order to be
prepared to close, Tricore will need to keep the $2,400,000 purchase price available along with
funds necessary for development and construction. R. pp. 2337-2340. In 2016, Tricore estimated
those at $4,642,000. Ex. 49. Thus, Tricore lost the use of $7,042,000 during the appeal. This also
means that at least $7,042,000 cannot be put toward other projects during the appeal. Interest
(7.375%) on that amount for 18 months is $779,021.25. Taking into consideration all of these
factors, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by setting the amount of the Supersedeas Bond
to address the loss of use based on the pmchase price of the property. R. p. 2435 -2436.

VI.

1.

APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES

Appellants are not entitled to fees and costs on appeal.

The Estate requests attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. Brinkmeyer/Stockton did not and
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have waived any claim to attorney fees on appeal. I.A.R. 4l(a) (2020). The Estate aclmowledges
the gravamen of this litigation arises from a commercial transaction entitling the prevailing party
to an award of attorney fees. There are no grounds to deem the Estate the prevailing party.

2.

Attorney fees and costs Should be awarded to Tricore on appeal.

Tricore should prevail on appeal and requests an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to
I.A.R. 40 and 41. The Court can award attorney fees on appeal pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121. "An award

ofattorney fees is appropriate ifthe appellant simply invites the Appellate Court to second guess the
trial court on conflicting evidence." Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 71 (2002). Appellants ask
for the trial comt' s findings of fact to be second guessed as to nearly all of the issues raised on appeal.
Thus, the Court should award appellate attorney fees based simply on I. C. § 12-121. The Comt also
may award appellate fees by application of the Trial Court's reasoning. R. pp. 2307-2323. The trial
court correctly held LC. § 12-120(3) and the Tricore PSA provides for prevailing party fees. The
court specifically found the "civil wrong committed as the objective ofthe conspiracy was the breach

of the Warren-Tricore PSA." The Trial Court correctly relied on Sims. "To determine whether the
significant part ofa claim is a commercial transaction, the court must analyze whether a commercial
transaction (1) is integral to the claim and (2) constitutes the basis ofa party's theory ofrecovery on
that claim." Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 985 (2015) and R. p. 2315.
Tricore prevailed based on the integral claim of enforcing the Tricore PSA. This constitutes
the grounds for all of Tri.core's claims against all of the Appellants. This Cmut should award attorney
fees and costs against all Appellants on the same basis as the trial court made such an award.

VII.

TRICORE'S CROSS APPEAL

A. The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Award Damages For The Tortious
Interference.
In finding Stockton/Brinkmeyer liable for tortious interference, the Trial Court found:
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As a result of the Estate's breach, Tricore lost both the property it had contracted to
purchase and all of the time and money it had expended over the preceding year on feasibiHty
studies, site analysis, engineering, and development plans. Rather than developing its newly
acquired property Tricore has spent two years embroiled in costly litigation. The final element is
satisfied.
R. p. 2016. Despite recognizing the tortious interference caused damages, including the loss of
use of the prope1fy for two years, the Trial Court ened by overlooking the evidence of the loss of
use damages and reliance which were presented at trial. As explained below, Tricore presented
competent evidence of the damages it incurred as a result of being deprived of the property.
A tort measure of damages applies to intentional interference with a contract. Barlow v.
International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 896 (1974). "Thus, in a proper case, general

damages, damages for unforeseen expenses, and even punitive damages may be recovered." Id.
Damages are not limited to damages within the contemplation of the parties to the contract. Id.
Proof of reasonable certainty of damages "requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical

exactitude, rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages.from
the realm of speculation." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740 (2007).
[I]t will be enough if the evidence show tlte extent oftlte damages as a matter ofjust
and reasonable inference, altltouglt tlte result may be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with exactness and
precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for making,
were othenvise.

***
Juries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential as well as direct and positive
proof. And when,from tlte nature oftlte case, the amount of damages cannot be
estimated witlt certainty, or only a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no
objection to placing before the jury all tlte facts and circumstances of tlte case, having
any tendency to sit ow damages, or their probable amount, so as to enable them to make
tlte most intelligible and probable estimate wlticlt tlte nature of the case will permit.
Raymond v. Idaho State Police, 165 Idaho 682, 687(2019).
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Here, the Trial Court overlooked the evidence of damages presented. Specifically, the
evidence included damages relating to preparing to use the property, the loss of the use of the
property and the increase in construction costs which occuned the two years Tricore was
deprived of the property. There was evidence of $170,000 expended in reliance and the two year
delay resulted in expenses for work no longer usable. Tr., p. 208, 11. 15-25; Tr. p. 207, 11. 10-20.
The evidence also established a loss of two years of use. Based upon the foundation of
knowledge Mort had developing property, Mort testified that during that two year period costs for
construction and development increased by "35 to 45 percent." Tr. 206, 11. 1-6. Mott testified he
estimated this increased construction and development cost would increase the cost of
development by $2,500,000. This was supported by the evidence in the record setting forth the
estimated costs of development and the percentage of increase. See Ex. 49, COE p. 37-39.
Stockton/Brinlaneyer' s own expert confirmed that between 2016 and 2018 the costs associated
with construction increased.

See Tr. 1316, 11. 19-25; Tr. 1317, 11. 1-4.

Despite being an

experienced estimator, who offered opinions with regard to the costs estimated for Tricores'
development, he refused to estimate the percentage of increase. See Tr. 1317, 11. 5-25; Tr. 1318,
11. 1-15. However, he did confirm Mort's testimony labor and material expenses increased. Tr.
1318, 11. 2-5. This left Mott's testimony the only competent evidence as to how much the
development expenses increased.
Mort also testified the property was worth far more than the $2,400,000 contract amount
with a value between $3,500,000 to $7,000,000. Tr. 209, 11. 9-23; Tr. 210, 11.21-25; and Tr. 211,

11. 1-6. He also testified to all the potential uses for the propetty over the two years and the lost
opportunities. Tr. 353, 11. 3-25; Tr. 354, 11. 1-16. See also Tr. 1607, 11. 20-25; Tr. 1608, 11. 1-23;
and Tr. 1609, 11. 1-12. The evidence confirmed the property was w01th more than $2,400,000.
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The County assessed the three (3) parcels at a total value of $7,009,520.00 in 2017 and 2018. Ex.
70, COE p. 789-791. Morse testified at the tax appeal hearing as to "actual and functional" use
value and the County assessed the value of all three (3) parcels at $3,505,351.00. Ex. 69, COE p.
792. Tricore's expert Appraiser valued the property $5,445,000 as of October 7, 2016 and
$6,425,000 as of trial. Ex. 72, COE p. 835-918. Hall testified based on extensive experience
specific to Priest Lake property as the State of Idaho Department of Land's designated appraiser
for the Voluntary Auction for Ownership Program. Tr. 913-4. Hall testified his opinions of value
on the property reflect the "enhanced value" above the contract price Tricore created by its efforts
to verify the ability to use and develop the property. Tr. 949-95. Morse an appraiser previously
hired by Brinlaneyer testified his opinion of value was $2,680,000 as of September, 2016 and
$2,785,000.00 as of August, 2018. Tr. 1495; Ex. 254, COE pp. 551-709.
As a result, the evidence was the property had a value between $2,680,000 -$7,009,520.00.
This means Stockton/Brinkmeyer wrongfully deprived Tricore of between $280,000 - $4,609,520.
The evidence established Tricore was deprived of the use of the property and the increased value
during the two year period leading up to trial. As a result, the Trial Court erred by failing to
recognize the loss of use damages.
B. The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Award Damages For the ICPA Violation.

The ICPA provides a party may recover actual damages, or $1,000.00, whichever is
greater. LC. § 48-608(1). The deceptive practices resulted in the loss of use of the property. In
addition, having determined Tricore proved its ICPA claim, the trial court was required to award
at least $1,000 in damages. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890 (2004). As explained above, the
loss of use damages were substantial and supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Trial
Court erred by not awarding any damages under the I CPA.
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Tricore respectfully requests the issue of damages for tortious interference and the ICPA
be remanded for determination based on the record of an amount which addresses Tricore' s loss
of use and reliance.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Tri core respectfully requests the Court affitm the Trial Court's decisions on all issues
except the failme to award damages for the Tortious Interference Claims and ICPA claims.
Tricore requests this matter be remanded to the Trial Comi with direction to enter an award of
damages on those claims and award Tricore the attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

DATED this 7th day of July, 2020.

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM

By Isl Brent Featherston
Attorney for Respondent Tricore
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